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11  The EU Commission and (Non-)Compliance in the Member 
States 
Summary 
What happens when member states do not comply with EU law? To answer this 
question, the role of the EU Commission as guardian of the treaties demands par-
ticular attention, especially the instruments it may employ, and the enforcement 
policy it actually pursues, against member states that violate binding EU rules. 
Our qualitative data on how fifteen member states have transposed a sample of six 
EU social policy Directives allows us to confront the Commission’s enforcement 
policy with the “real” amount of domestic transposition failures. We thus chal-
lenge the approach taken by much of the existing literature, which looks at the tip 
of the iceberg only by restricting itself to the analysis of available data on EU in-
fringement procedures.  
This allows us to reject or validate some of the most dominant assumptions in this 
literature about the logics of Commission enforcement policy. We show that en-
forcement often does not take place at all or does not take place in a consistent 
manner when compared to the Commission’s own rules. Moreover, we demon-
strate that the Commission heavily focuses on non-notification rather than on in-
correct transposition. One of the explanations is that infringement procedures are 
constrained by the length and complexity of the Commision’s internal procedures. 
Although our data suggest significant diversity in the treatment of different mem-
ber states, we argue that this is not the result of political favouritism but of the ne-
cessity to prioritise some cases over others under the conditions of administrative 
overload. Our sample shows that these prioritisations often follow different Direc-
tives. It seems that the choice is made largely by the responsible unit and depends 
on its workload, the complexity of the Directive, and the overall importance at-
tached to the respective policy. Furthermore, we show that neither the general 
level of labour law protection, nor the level of misfit with pre-existing national 
policies, nor opposition during the negotiations determine the Commission’s en-
forcement policy – even though the last factor does have some influence. 
Finally, we discuss kick-start, acceleration and correction as different effects that 
infringement procedures had in the implementation processes under scrutiny. Manuscript     Falkner/Treib/Hartlapp/Leiber     Chapter 11: EU Commission and (Non-)Compliance  spring 2004 
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Overall we conclude that infringement proceedings as they are practised today are 
a rather inadequate instrument for assuring compliance, even though the situation 
would be even worse if there were none at all. 
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What does EU law truly mean for the member states? Do they abide or 
don’t they? This book presents the first encompassing and in-depth em-
pirical study of the effects of ‘voluntaristic’ and partly ‘soft’ EU policies in 
the member states. The authors examine 90 case studies across a range 
of EU Directives and shed light on burning contemporary issues in politi-
cal science, integration theory, and social policy. They reveal that there 
are major implementation failures and that, to date, the European Com-
mission has not been able adequately to perform its control function. 
While all countries are occasional non-compliers, some quite frequently 
put their domestic political concerns above the requirements of EU law. 
Others neglect these EU obligations as a matter of course. This innova-
tive study answers questions of crucial importance for politics in theory 
and in practice, and suggests how implementation of EU law can be fos-
tered in the future. 
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